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When George Washington traveled from his home to 
Philadelphia for the inauguration, it took about eight 
days to make the 200 mile trip. This fact doesn't seem 
to startle us until we realize that Washington had no 
advantage in travel over the people of ancient Babylon. 
George Washington and King Solomon lived 3,000 years 
apart, yet they had the same horsepower, the same plumb­
ing, etc. Since the 17th century, the amount of po­
tential knowledge has increased far beyond the quantity 
of actual knowledge. Dante is said to have known every­
thing there was to know in western Christendom in the 
year 1300. Goethe knew the greater part of what there 
was to know in the year 1800 - but since the year 1831 
(the year after a locomotive beat a horse in a race and 
the real beginning of modern technology) it has been im­
possible for the most intellectual person to master more 
than a fraction of what there is to know. Here we are-­
presumably the smartest generation in history--but there 
is more we don't know than any other generation. 
Times are also changing in the transportation of 
our grains and in1the historical relationships of grain prices and basis. The fall of 1979 the price of cash 
grain in parts of the Midwest was farther below the 
futures than ever before in history. The historic re­
lationships between cash and future prices, that one 
could esti�ate with a fair degree of confidence a year 
ahead, seemed to be gone. In many places, the railroad 
upon which the historic price relations were made, was 
gone. For periods of time there were either no firm cash 
bids offered to producers, or the price offered was far 
below historical prices in relation to the grain futures 
and terminal cash grain prices. 
1Basis in grain terminology is the difference between a 
grain future price and a cash price for a specific 
locality. Different localities are apt to have different 
basis for the same future. There is also a basis for 
each trading month such as a December basis, a March 
basis, a July basis, etc. 
Table 1. Minneapolis and Country Point December Basis 
History for Corn as of November 1 
Crop Chicago Dec Minn. Minn. Trans. Local 
Year Future Price Basis Cost/Bu. Basis 
1968 110 105 5 under 13 18 under 
1969 117 110 7 under 13 20 under 
1970 149 131 18 under 14 32 under 
1971 115 103 12 under 15 27 under 
1972 139 120 19 under 16 35 under 
1973 240 220 20 under 17 17 under 
1974 376 355 21 under 18 39 under 
1975 278 261 17 under 19 36 under 
1976 253 237 16 under 23 39 under 
1977 218 196 22 under 24 46 under 
1978 232 204 28 under 29 57 under 
1979 258 225 33 under 37 70 under 
1980 
Table 2. Sioux City and Country Point December Basis 
History for Corn as of November 1 
Crop Chicago Dec. Sioux City Sioux City Trans. Local 
Year · Future Price Basis Cost/Bu. · Basis 
1968 110 104 6 under 11¢ 17 under 
1969 117 107 10 under 11¢ 21 under 
1970 149 128 21 under 12¢ 33 under 
1971 115 105 10 under 13¢ 23 under 
1972 139 124 15 under 14¢ 29 under 
1973 240 220 20 under 16¢ 36 under 
1974 376 345 31 under 17¢ 48 under 
1975 278 246 32 under 17¢ 49 under 
1976 253 225 28 under 21¢ 49 under 
1977 218 190 28 under 22¢ 50 under 
1978 232 204 28 under 25¢ 53 under 
1979 258 214 44 under 30¢ 74 under 
1980 
The basis given in Tables 1 and 2 is the basis for 
November 1 only. There were other days in November 1979 
where the local basis reached more than a dollar a bushel 
under the future, for both corn and soybeans. Similar 
but not so great a spread in basis occured in other 
grains. 
Why is this inconsistant basis a problem to grain 
producers? It's a problem for those who use basis to 
forward price grain, or to determine what crops to plant 
where alternative crops can effectively be produced. 
It's a problem when one has grain to sell, and there is 
no firm price available. It's a problem if one is going 
to hedge and historical price relationships are dis­
turbed. However, problems can become opportunities if 
the proper logic and strategies can be applied. The 
first logical step would appear to be an analysis of 
what makes a wide basis and which of these ingredients 
are apt to persist in the coming months. Figure 1 
attempts to identify such conditions and indicate their 
estimated relevance for the marketing years 1979-80 
and 1980-81. 
Figure 1. Estimated Basis Relationship 1979-80 and 
1980-81 
Conditions Affecting Basis 
What Makes a Wide Basis 
(1) Transportation 
(a) Increasing rates 
(b) Irregular service 
(c) Erratic rates 
(2) Cost of Storage 
(a) Interest 
1979-80 1980-81 · 
yes 
yes 
yes 
15-19% 
yes 
improved 
improved 
(b) Corrrrnercial rate 2¢/mo. 
12-15 more 
stable 
2¢/mo. 
same (c) Carrying charge in futures Not a 
full 
carrying 
(3) Risk 
(4) Unusual demand for storage 
(5) Large than normal crops and 
stock (may vary by kind of 
grain) 
(6) Unstorable 
(7) Decreased export demand 
charge 
moderate moderate 
yes less 
demand 
yes stock-yes 
crop­
probably no 
no no 
no no 
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Based on the above analysis it can be concluded that 
the 1980-81 basis for the grain we are considering is not 
apt to be substantially wider than the 1979-80 basis even 
with expected increases in rail rates. With this infor­
mation, a planting strategy can be determined where alter­
native crops can be produced. A marketing strategy can 
also be developed. 
The marketing strategy would evolve from the analyses 
of the fundamentals primarily supply, demand or projected 
use and carryover. Some analysts use charts to estimate 
market trends, but these are usually short term trends. 
The market decisions to be made will be to sell before 
planting, before harvest, to store or a combination of 
all of these options. Decisions must also be made as to 
how much to sell, and whether to sell through use of 
futures or by cash grain contract. No attempt will be 
made to go into the advantages and disadvantages of 
various marketing methods in this paper. 
Once one is aware of what the basis may be on the 
grains to be marketed, then profitability of alternative 
crops can be examined. Table 3, which is an actual work­
sheet completed by a group of South Dakota Farmers on 
February 27, 1980, demonstrates the process. The group 
decided ahead of time they wanted to use only out of 
pocket costs in the comparison. The lock in price often 
gives the informed producer the option of selecting a 
cash grain contract price or selling grain futures, 
whichever seems most advan��g�ous at the time. 
There are certain advantages in using futures to 
forward price grains. 
Advantages in Pricing Grain With Futures 
(1) It is simpler to adjust to changing conditions 
(2) Futures offer alternatives in delivering grain 
(a) Time of delivery not so definite 
(b) You are not locked in to deliver at 
certain elevator 
(c) You need not deliver grain at all 
(3) Pricing in futures ·not as contingent on having 
enough transportation at harvest time 
(4) Usually simpler to offset in case of crop 
failure 
(5) Futures may represent higher prices than cash 
grain contract prices. 
I 
., . 
Often futures represent a price considerably higher than 
the "to arrive" price. If this difference is �Oto 20 
cents a bushel, the producer may agree to assume any risk 
in basis change himself and use the futures for price 
determination. 
There are, of course, disadvantages to forward 
pricing grain with futures. 
Disadvantages in Pricing Grain With Futures 
(1) Margin deposit of about 15 percent of the 
value of the grain required 
(2) Additional margins are required as market 
moves adversely to expectations; __ ,, ··· · ··· 
(3) Futures sales do not promise an exact price 
as they are based on historical relationships 
(Cash grain contracts offer an exact price) 
(4) Not all grains are traded in futures, so 
certain grains such as rye, flaxseed, durum 
wheat, and barley cannot be hedged in a special 
future 
(5) Futures trading requires training 
One very good argument for learning how to under­
stand and use futures is that there were several times 
and locations in the Midwest in 1978 and 1979 where no 
firm cash bid was offered to producers. Rail trans­
portation,was not available and the availability of 
truck transportation was not dependable. Rates for 
truck transportation, when it was available, were very 
erratic and unpredictable. Thus, grain buyers at local 
elevators either did not have a firm bid or they had no 
bid at all for producers. 
Consider the example of the hard red spring wheat 
producer whose local elevator in 1979 could not give him 
a price on his wheat except at a historically wide basis. 
This was because there were no rail cars available and 
there was a strike at the Duluth port. This producer, 
because of land and operating capital payments, wanted 
to be assured he would not have to take less than the 
$3.70 per bushel the market should normally represent. 
Local elevators were bidding 20-25 cents a bushel less 
than this. The producer was advised to sell a Minnea­
polis December future to protect the price. On Septem­
ber 13 when Minneapolis December futures were at $4.29, 
he sold 5,000 bushels. On November 8, cars were again 
available, the strike was over creating a sharp demand 
for immediate delivery wheat. Cash wheat was bid.at $3.86 
and the December future was at $4.08. At this time the 
producer sold his wheat and lifted his hedge. How did he 
come out? 
l 
Figure 2. Pricing Hard Red Spring Wheat 
Cash Futures 
Basis - 59 9/13/79 
Cash Wheat Normal Value $3. 70 Sold Mpls Dec Wheat@ $4. 29 
Basis - 22 11/8/79 
Sold Cash Wheat@ 
Gain 
$3;86 Bot Mpls Dec Wheat@ $4.08 
$ .16 Gain $ .21 
The producer in this example gained a gross 37 cents 
a bushel from Se�tember 13 to November 8. He received a 
gross price of (�3. 86 from elevator +21 cents from future) 
�4.07 for his wheat that he was trying to protect at 
$3.70. His costs were $50. 00 for the complete in and 
out transaction for 5, 000 bushel future contract and the 
interest on $600 of margin (hedging rate) for 41 days. 
The interest amounted to about �8. The historically wide 
basis on September 13 of 59 under narrowed to a histori­
cally narrow basis November 8 of 22 under. A historically 
wide basis means best opportunities for gain are in 
hedging or storing grain. A historically narrow basis 
suggests selling as the most profitable. 
Next, consider the soybean producer who could not get 
what he thought was a reasonable bid on the soybeans that 
he harvested mid October 1979. This producer knew of 
increased plantings of soybeans in Brazil as well as the 
large increase in U.S. carryover stocks. Both of these 
factors signaled lower prices. On October 19, this 
producer sold January soybean futures at $6.77. The 
best cash bid he had on his soybeans that day was $5.76. 
On December 18, he was able to sell his soybeans for 
$5.96 and to lift his hedge at $6.61. How did this 
producer's hedge come out? 
Figure 3. Pricing Soybeans 
Cash Futures 
Basis - 101 10/19 
Cash bid for soybeans $5.76 Sold Chicago Jan. @ $6.77 
future 
Basis - 65 12/18 
Sold cash soybeans $5.96 Bot Chicago Jan. @ $6.61 
future 
Gain $ .20 Gain $ .16 
This soybean producer grossed ($5.96 from the elevator 
+16 cents from futures) $6.12 for soybeans that he was pro­
tecting at $5.76. The soybean price in this area declined 
about �l per bushel, after December 18, 1979. Tables 1 
and 2 show that transportation cost is a significant part 
of local basis. 
A lack of transportation for grains is not a new 
problem. Some of the producer strategies used to combat 
the problem are not new either. The futures market is 
over 100 years old. It is just recently that producers 
have been interested in strategies that will help them in 
periods of no cash price bid or greatly lower prices 
because of a distorted cash - future price relationship. 
The high cost of production and the high cost of owning 
an inventory of grain have given impetus to this desire 
for some strategy to help producers get the highest price 
possible for their grains. By reviewing an actual ex­
perience of a producer in 1976, one can observe the 
hedging of wheat until it can be shipped. 
On September 2, 1976, a farmer had his wheat har­
vested and wanted to sell it, but the surrounding grain 
elevators were full and could not take his grain. Nation­
ally, the carryover of wheat was 435 million bushels in 
1974-75, and 665 million in 1975-76. It was projected 
to be over 1 billion bushels in 1976-77. Because of 
the increase in supplies of wheat, this producer felt he 
needed price protection. The elevators were offering 
depressed prices for delayed shipment or would not offer 
a price until transportation was available. On September 
2, when the local cash-price was $3.12 if he could have 
sold, and the Minneapolis March futures were at $3.57, 
this producer sold Minneapolis March futures to protect 
the price of wheat he had just completed harvesting and 
placed in his bins. He sold his wheat and lifted his 
hedge on September 30 when transportation was again 
available. At this time local cash wheat price had 
dropped to $2.78 per bushel and the Minneapolis March 
futures had dropped to $3.03. 
1976 
Date 
9/2 
9/9 
9/16 
9/23 
9/30 
Thursday Prices for Hard Spring Wheat Local Prices 
Farmers Elevator Company, Hometown, U.S.A. 
1976 
Local Cash (14 Pro) M£1S. March Futures Basis 
3.12 3.57 45 
3.17 3.56 39 
2.98 3.33 35 
2.95 3.25 30 
2.78 3. 03 25 
How did this producer come out with the �edging 
strategy used?· 
Figure 4. Pricing Wheat 
Cash 
Basis - 45 9/2 
Futures 
Wheat in bin value $3.12 Sold Hpls. March @ $3. 57 
wheat 
Basis - 25 9/30 
Sold cash wheat $2. 78 Bot Mpls. March @ $3. 03 
wheat 
Loss $ .34 Gain $ .54 
The producer got $2. 78 from the elevator, and .54 
cents from the futures, or he got ($2.78 + .54) $3.32 
for his wheat. He not only protected his price of 
$3.12, he also got paid for the additional storage 
and handling. 
There will likely continue to be times each year 
when transportation will not be adequate to accommodate 
delivery of grain from the farms. We cannot afford a 
transportation system that can handle all the grain 
during or immediately following harvesting of grain. 
Producers need to realize that selling or pricing need 
not be simultaneous with delivery. They must develop 
strategies that will establish a price, and whenever 
possible, adopt a strategy that will also pay for the 
cost of holding grain for an additional period of 
time. 
The cost of holding an inventory must become a 
part of any marketing strategy because of its impact on 
net price received for commodities. For example, pro­
ducers who store soybeans worth $6 per bushel while pay­
ing 16 percent for the capital to carry that inventory, 
were incurring an interest cost of 8 cents per bushel, 
per month. If they were to hold a soybean inventory 
10 months under the above conditions, they would need an 
80 cent a bushel price rise just to cover the interest 
cost. 
We are talking about strategies that been available 
for a long period of time but that have not been used 
extensively by producers. They have not been used be­
cause we have not been effective in changing traditional 
Table 4. Interest Cost for Holding Grain Inventory at Various Connnodity Values and 
Interest Rates 
Cost in Dollars, Per Bushel, Per Montn 
Bu. $ 8% 9% HY7o II'7o 12% 13% 14'7o 15% 16% 
1. 00 .0067 .0075 00083 .0092 .0100 .0108 .0117 .0125 .0133 
1. 25 .0083 .0094 .0104 .0115 .0125 .0135 .0146 .0156 .0167 
1. 50 .0100 .0112 .0125 .0138 .0150 .0163 .0175 .0188 .0200 
1. 75 .0117 00131 .0146 .0161 .0175 .0190 .0204 .0219 .0233 
2.00 .0133 .0150 .0167 .0183 .0200 .0217 .0233 .0250 .0267 
2.25 .0150 .0169 .0188 .0207 .0225 .0244 .0263 .0281 .0300 
2.50 .0167 .0188 .0208 .0229 .0250 .0271 .0292 .0313 .0333 
2.75 .0183 .0206 .0229 .0253 .0275 .0298 .0321 .0344 .0367 
3.00 .0200 .0225 ,0250 .0275 .0300 .0325 .0350 .0375 .0400 
3.25 .0217 .0244 .0271 .0298 .0325 .0352 .0379 .0406 .0433 
3.50 .0233 .0262 .0292 .0321 .0350 .0379 .0408 .0438 .0467 
3.75 .0250 .0281 .0313 .0344 .0375 .0406 .0438 .0469 .0500 
4.00 .0267 .0300 .0333 .0367 .0400 .0433 .0467 .0500 .0533 
4.25 .0283 .0319 .0354 .0390 .0425 .0460 .0496 .0531 .0567 
4.50 .0300 .0338 00375 .0413 .0450 .0488 .0525 .0563 .0600 
4.75 .0317 .0356 .0396 .0436 .0475 .0515 .0554 .0594 .0633 
5.00 .0333 .0375 .0417 .0458 .0500 .0542 .0583 00625 .0667 
5.25 .0350 .0394 .0438 .0482 .0525 .0569 .0613 .0656 .0700 
5.50 .0367 .0413 .0458 .0504 .0550 .0596 .0642 .0688 .0733 
5.75 .0383 .9431 .0479 .0527 .0575 .0623 .0671 .0719 .0767 
6.00 .0400 .0450 .0500 00550 .0600 .0650 .0700 .0750 .0800 
6.25 .0417 .0469 .0521 .0573 .0625 .0677 .0729 .0781 .0833 
6.50 .0433 .0488 .0542 .0596 00650 .0704 .0758 .0813 .0867 
6.75 .0450 .0506 .0563 .0619 .0675 .0731 .0788 .0844 .0900 
7.00 .0467 .0525 .0583 ,0642 .0700 .0758 .0817 .0875 .0933 
Table 4. Continued 
Cost in Dollars, Per Busnel, Per Montn 
Bu. $ 8'7o 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% IZi% 15% 16% 
7.25 .0483 .0544 .0604 .0665 .0725 .0785 .0846 .0906 .0967 
7.50 .0500 .0563 .0625 .0688 .0750 .0813 .0875 .0938 .1000 
7.75 .0517 .0581 .0646 .0711 .0775 .0840 .0904 .0969 .1033 
8.00 .0533 .0600 .0667 .0733 .0800 .0867 .0933 .1000 .0167 
8.25 .0550 .0619 .0688 .0757 .0825 .0894 .0963 .1031 .1100 
8.50 .0567 .0638 .0708 .0779 .0850 .0921 .0992 .1063 .1133 
8.75 .0583 .0656 .0729 .0803 .0875 .0948 .1021 .1094 .1167 
9.00 .0600 .0675 .0750 .0825 .0900 .0975 .1050 .1125 .1200 
9.25 .0617 .0694 .0771 00848 .0925 .1002 .1079 .1156 .1233 
9.50 .0633 .0713 .0792 .0871 .0950 .1029 .1108 .1188 .1267 
9.75 .0650 .0731 .0813 .0894 .0975 .1056 .1138 .1219 .1300 
10.00 .0667 .0750 .0833 .0917 .1000 .1083 .1167 .1250 .1333 
marketing methods. We have not convinced producers that 
there are ways of offsetting a position in the market 
and thereby eliminating a prevalent fear in forward 
pricing of grain and because of the possibility of having 
something happen to th.eir crop. 
In a recent survey of 796 South Dakota and Montana 
farmers, one of the questions asked was in regard to 
their willingness to forward price grain. About 60 per­
cent responded they would forward price grain most or half 
of the time if it weren't for the fear of a crop loss. 
Table 5. How Often Would You Contract To Sell Your 
Grain Ahead Of Harvest If It weren't For 
The Fear Of Being Short Of Crop At Delivery? 
Response Number Percent 
Most of the time 151 19.0 
Half of the time 317 41.4 
Hardly ever 297 38.8 
No response 31 0.8 
TOTAL 796 100.0 
The Extension service at South Dakota State Univer­
sity offers a three-day workshop on the use of grain 
futures, where participants learn how to offset a position 
if their crop fails, or if they change their mind, and 
how they can roll a future ahead if they want to extend 
the time. After attending such a workshop, one producer 
sold his expected 1980 crop through the futures. He did 
this on December 21, 1979 at a price of 7.48 for the 
November 1980 future. He did this because he could lock 
in a price well above the cost of production. Time will 
tell if he would have been better off to not sell at 
that time, but as of June 1, 1980, he had a gain of 96 
cents a bushel from the sale of the November 1980 futures. 
I have mentioned grain futures often as a marketing 
strategy when inadequate transportation distorts normal 
price relationships. Futures are mentined often in this 
topic because they are in many instances the 1nl¥ �rice 
available. Futures also allow the greatest f exibility 
in extending price protection over a long period of time. 
The alternatives for those who do not want to use 
futures to price grain when there is no transportation, 
range from none to very limited. 
*They can use a cash grain contract if the elevator 
will offer them one. Contracted grain usually has 
preference over non-contracted, but when transportation 
is limited, contract prices may be lower than what would 
be normal market price. 
*They can use a deferred payment contract, again if 
the elevator will offer them one. However, the deferred 
payment price is also often a depressed price when trans­
portation is scarce. 
*Or, they can take a cash contract for some time in 
the future subject to the availability of transportation. 
This is not a sure price protection, but it will protect 
the price if the transportation situation improves. 
We can expect to continue to have problems in market­
ing grain and with transportation. Many of the existing 
problems will still be with us and new problems are on 
the horizon. Deregulation of transportation has some 
cited advantages, but it will also create additional 
problems in the estimating of local bases. 
The ongoing shift in regulatory thinking and appli­
cation by the ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission) and 
the FRA (Federal Railroad Authority) is to allow more market 
determination of rates, routes, and service. It appears 
this will be the prevalent political thinking for the 
forseable future. The variability of supply and demand 
for transportation by the grain sector, combined with the 
new deregulation thinking, will bring new problems in the 
estimation of basis in the future. If transportation 
rates and services fluctuate, the local basis is apt to 
be volitile and uncertain, making the grain futures 
strategy harder to employ. Ways to deal with this might 
be: 
--Study the historical transportation demand 
patterns, incorporate current knowledge, and 
make informed predictions of future trans­
portation rates and service and therefore 
local basis. 
�-Invest in ones own transportation by owning 
or leasing trucks or rail cars. 
--Contract for transportation services, e.g., 
a local elevator contracting with the railroad 
or a trucking company for guaranteed rates 
and service. In turn, the local elevator 
guarantees to the carrier a minimum volume 
for the term of the contract. 
Other methods of minimizing uncertainty will evolve as 
we experiment with deregulation of transportation. 
The solutions to any problems caused by changes in 
demand, cost and availability of transportation are not 
to wait for what we may consider normalcy, but rather, 
to try to maximize returns under existing conditons. 
This may be done by following various courses of action: 
--Find ways of establishing a price that is equal 
to or above a producers traditional time and 
method of selling grain 
--Break from the association that pricing and 
delivery need be simultaneous 
--Discard the near impossible goal of selling 
at the top of the market or buying at the low 
--Understand and use the many marketing guides 
and tools that are currently available to us 
--Use market information in determining what to 
plant where there are cropping alternatives 
If we will do these things, then problems may become 
opportunities and we can quit talking about the labor 
pains and start showing off the baby. 
